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Abstract Evolutionary mismatch is, roughly, poor fit between an organism and
its environment. Researchers in evolutionary medicine have proposed mismatch
as a possible cause for morbidity and mortality in contemporary Homo sapiens
populations. Mismatch hypotheses are often taken to provide an evolutionary ex-
planation for the health outcome in question, while simultaneously offering possible
interventions for researchers and clinicians to pursue. A problem: fitness outcomes
and health outcomes are distinct. Natural selection operates on fitness, not on
health per se. There are cases where increased health may not contribute to fit-
ness in the modern environment. I propose an approach for using evolutionary
mismatch in clinical research which sidesteps this problem. The gist of the pro-
posal: given structural analogies between environmental causes of morbidity and
environmental causes of fitness reductions, evolutionary mismatch can be used as
a heuristic to shrink the space through which clinical and public health researchers
must search for possible interventions in response to contemporary health prob-
lems.
Keywords Evolutionary mismatch · Fitness · Evolution · Health · Research ·
Heuristics
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the use of evolutionary mismatch hypotheses in evolution-
ary medicine. Evolutionary mismatch is a putative biological phenomenon which
results when an organism (or population, or trait) which evolved in one environ-
ment experiences an environmental change with health or fitness consequences.
I argue that the mismatch framework can be used as a heuristic for discovering
interventions, even when it is not used for true ultimate explanations.
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Evolutionary medicine as a discipline has attempted to apply the insights of
evolutionary biology to clinical research and practice. The general motivation for
evolutionary medicine is simply this: humans are evolved organisms, and under-
standing how and why we evolved the way we have may shed light on our physi-
ological, social, and psychological needs. Evolutionary biology, in this framework,
helps us to understand not only why we have the needs we have, but may also
help us develop ways to meet those needs. If nothing else, evolutionary explana-
tions must be the ultimate explanations for many causes of human morbidity and
mortality. Consequently, Nesse and Williams (1994) tell us, “Nothing in medicine
makes sense, except in the light of evolution.”
Mismatch hypotheses have been used implicitly and explicitly throughout evo-
lutionary medicine and evolutionary psychology, and as a result putative mismatch
phenomena include allergies, anxiety, atherosclerosis, autoimmunity, breast can-
cer, depression, type II diabetes, obesity, and many others. (See e.g. Williams and
Nesse (1991); Nesse and Williams (1994); Trevathan (1999); Gluckman and Han-
son (2006); Trevathan et al. (2008); Gluckman et al. (2009); Lindeberg (2010).)
Fitness and health are different phenomena, however. I show that some putative
mismatch hypotheses do not seem to involve reduced fitness, but only reduced
health. Consequently, it is not clear whether mismatch is an appropriate lens for
thinking about health problems.
Rather than treat mismatch as a proper explanation, then, I propose treating
mismatch as a heuristic—a framework for identifying hypotheses and targets for
clinical or public health intervention, rather than an explanation in its own right.
If mismatch thinking is fruitful in a clinical context, then treating mismatch as a
heuristic allows the researcher to sidestep the problem I raise.
This paper does not present a comprehensive case for adopting a mismatch
heuristic. Instead, seeing that mismatch thinking is already in use in evolutionary
medicine, I warn mismatch researchers of a problem in the project and show how
they can escape the problem.
2 Fitness and health
2.1 Evolutionary medicine
Evolutionary medicine is a discipline which seeks to apply the insights of evolu-
tionary biology to clinical research and practice. It dates to at least 1991, with the
publication of Williams and Nesse (1991). (Earlier work, e.g. Eaton and Konner
(1985), employs similar reasoning and reflects on similar themes.) Given that Homo
sapiens is an evolved species, our physiology and psychology are also evolved. At
a bare minimum, then, ultimate explanations for our physiology and psychology
will be evolutionary in nature (not necessarily to say that the explanations will be
adaptationist). Perhaps, the thinking goes, understanding our evolutionary history
and the nature of evolutionary phenomena can help us better understand our own
physiological or psychological needs.
Nesse and Williams (1994) point to six general evolutionary explanations of
vulnerability to disease: (1) defenses (unpleasant defense responses to illness, e.g.
a cough when one has pneumonia), (2) infection (forces which cause humans to
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develop immune responses which in turn drive pathogen evolution), (3) novel en-
vironments (new environments to which a species is not well-adapted), (4) genes
(novel deleterious effects from ancient, benign genes in new environments, as well
as heterozygote-advantage genetic disorders), (5) design compromises (evolution-
ary trade-offs), and (6) effects of past evolution (e.g. the fact that in humans food
must pass by the trachea).
Evolutionary medicine has been criticized for a general adaptationism and for
seeming failures to provide clinically-relevant hypotheses. (Valles (2012); Cournoyea
(2013)) I am generally quite sympathetic to these critiques. However, the key in-
sight of evolutionary medicine—that our evolutionary history explains, at the very
least, our current physiological and psychological needs—seems worth preserving.
In particular, I am interested in so-called mismatch hypotheses: hypotheses in-
spired by the view that humans are in some ways better-adapted to life as hunter-
gatherers on the African savanna than to life in post-agricultural societies.1 This
idea is captured primarily in (3) above: for much of Homo sapiens, life no longer
resembles a primary environment in which we evolved—and this has had impacts
on our health. Key to this approach is the view that humans are still very similar
to our ancestors on the savanna, such that our physiological and psychological
needs (broadly-construed) will also be very similar. This is not a claim that hu-
mans are frozen in evolutionary time, of course, but rather that the quantity and
significance of evolutionary changes are relatively small.
2.2 Evolutionary mismatch
Before we dive into the mismatch concept itself, one more concept should be
sketched: the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, or EEA. This term refers,
roughly, to the environment for which a lineage has evolved—its ancestral environ-
ment.2 The EEA is a tricky concept to characterize with precision, and of necessity
the following discussion makes some idealizing assumptions and elisions.
Here is an intuitive way to think about the EEA: populations are made up
of organisms with varying capabilities and vulnerabilities, which enable them to
leverage certain environmental features for their own use but which leave them
vulnerable to other detrimental environmental features. Given enough time in a
particular environment and some stability in the environment’s selection pressures,
the population’s distribution of capabilities and vulnerabilities will likely change
such that it comes to ‘fit’ that environment better than it had in the past. In
1Much evolutionary medicine and mismatch-oriented work (e.g. Eaton and Konner (1985),
Nesse and Williams (1994), Gluckman and Hanson (2006), and Lindeberg (2010)) are interested
in major environmental changes experienced by the human species, and point to the transition
from foraging to agriculture—with its alterations in diet, social structure, activity levels, and
so forth—as a particularly significant change.
2For the sake of brevity and in order to maintain some terminological continuity, I retain
the ‘EEA’ terminology, which I take to be roughly synonymous with how others use terms like
‘ancestral environment’. I do not use ‘EEA’ to signal any particular theoretical commitments.
Some characterizations of the EEA, e.g. the original characterization given in Bowlby (1982),
focus on adaptations which enable the population to thrive in the EEA. I encourage the reader
not to hunt too enthusiastically for how each trait I mention is an adaptation to a particular
adaptive problem: I do not make that claim, and my use of ‘EEA’ should not be construed to
imply it.
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such a case, the set of traits undergoing major directional change will presumably
get smaller.Environments are rarely perfectly stable, but sometimes a significant
change will occur which exposes new vulnerabilities or blunts the efficacy of old
capabilities such that one can see a meaningful discontinuity between the envi-
ronments. In such a case, the previous environment would be the (or perhaps an)
EEA.The EEA, then, is a historical environment for a population (or its lineage),
the selection pressures of which it has adapted to solve. Importantly, as I use the
term, relevant features of the EEA may be the absence of features present in the
novel environment: a certain type of predator, for example. That an organism lacks
the capability to cope with a particular novel predator will often be due to the
fact that the organism’s lineage did not need to cope with the predator. In this
case, we see no particular adaptations failing; instead, we see a vulnerability laid
bare by the changed environment.
I take it that none of this is novel to the reader, but I review it to situate the
EEA concept: it is, roughly, that environment to which the species is primarily
adapted. If a deer population has evolved in an environment with no predators,
then its EEA is a predator-free environment—and the introduction of predators
would be evolutionarily novel. In other words, populations may have traits to deal
with particular adaptive problems, but not others. Most mammals, for example,
have a terrestrial, rather than marine, EEA. For the most part, in other words,
Mammalia has not evolved to solve the adaptive problems of the ocean.
Evolutionary mismatch is often taken to involve a negative effect on an organ-
ism (or population) due to an environmental change relative to its EEA. (Lloyd
et al. (2011); Sih et al. (2010)) The mismatch concept itself has undergone rel-
atively little focused philosophical examination (except for Lloyd et al. (2011),
Garson (2015), Cofnas (2016), and Morris (2018)) and, consequently, there is no
firm consensus on how best to understand it (a bit more on this later). I will
bracket that debate here, as the clinical use of mismatch which I propose here
does not rest on a particular characterization but rather on the general themes
echoed in most mismatch hypotheses.
Mismatch, then, involves an environmental change which negatively affects a
population or its member organisms. The population adapted to one environment,
the EEA, and is now in a different environment. In evolutionary medicine, the
mismatch concept is employed to explain the prevalence of much morbidity and
mortality in contemporary Homo sapiens populations. Our EEA, the thinking
goes, is the African savanna—particularly, hunting and gathering on the savanna—
and to the extent that our current environment differs from our EEA in a way
which affects us negatively, there is an evolutionary mismatch. To explain a bit
more clearly, I will give three cases of putative mismatch: scurvy, myopia, and
reproductive cancers. In the interest of brevity, I will background some of the
evolutionary storytelling with respect to the origins of the traits or their status
as adaptations, neutral traits, etc. Instead, I will focus primarily on the negative
effects of the new environment relative to the EEA—the mismatchy part.
Ascorbic acid (vitamin C) is an essential nutrient for humans which plays a
role in various physiological functions, including wound healing and the immune
system. Homo sapiens is part of the haplorhine (dry-nosed primate) lineage, along
with the other apes, the monkeys, and the tarsiers. Approximately 50 mya, the
haplorhine lineage split from the strepsirrhine (wet-nosed primate) lineage, which
includes the lemurs, bush babies, pottos, and lorises. The strepsirrhines, like the
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vast majority of mammals, are capable of synthesizing ascorbic acid and do not
require it in the diet. The haplorhines, on the other hand, are not capable of
synthesizing ascorbic acid and must obtain it from their diet. Given ascorbic acid’s
critical role in bodily function, it might seem odd to lose the ability to synthesize
it—and yet our lineage has. Presumably, the thinking goes, primitive haplorhines
were at least partially frugivorous and did not require the ability to synthesize
a nutrient which was already abundant in the dietary environment. As a result,
the ascorbic acid-synthesizing trait was lost in the haplorhine lineage. (Pollock
and Mullin (1987)) The human EEA, then, is an environment with abundant
dietary vitamin C. If our environment changes such that we can no longer obtain
vitamin C through the diet—say, due to the fact that we are on a long ocean
voyage without fruits and vegetables—we can develop scurvy, a potentially life-
threatening illness. In such a case, there is (allegedly) an evolutionary mismatch.
This mismatch can be alleviated by recreating a feature of the EEA: ready access
to fruits and vegetables.
Myopia, or near-sightedness, is another putative example of mismatch. Linde-
berg (2010) (133,142-144,147-148) argues that insulin resistance may play a causal
role in the etiology of myopia.3 Contemporary human diets seem to increase in-
sulin resistance relative to the traditional diets of hunter-gatherers. In particular,
it seems that chronically high blood glucose levels appear to increase the insulin
resistance of tissues, which causes the pancreas to increase insulin levels in an at-
tempt to “overcome the resistance” (in Lindeberg’s words) in the cells. To simplify
a bit, high serum insulin levels appear to result in higher levels of free insulin-like
growth factor-1 (IGF-1). High IGF-1 levels in turn downregulate the activity of
retinoid receptors in the cell—receptors which inhibit cellular growth. Retinoids
produced in the retina and sclera help to inhibit growth of the eye. If retinoid
receptors are down-regulated by excessive IGF-1, the eye may continue growing
beyond what is useful for adequate vision, resulting in an eye which focuses light in
front of the retina, rather than on the retina—resulting in blurry distance vision.
If all this is right (and at this point it is hypothetical), then increased frequency
of myopia in contemporary populations relative to myopia frequency in hunter-
gatherers may be explained by the evolutionarily novel consumption of insulin
resistance-promoting food in the diet. In other words, consuming high levels of
food which promote insulin resistance is a change relative to the human EEA,
and has a corresponding health effect. To reduce myopia (and similar problems
caused by evolutionarily novel foods), Lindeberg (2010) suggests the consumption
of foods similar to those of humans’ hunter-gatherer ancestors—foods which do
not promote insulin resistance.4 To be clear: this hypothesis is not yet well-tested.
Whether the hypothesis is correct or incorrect is beyond my purposes here, which
is simply to clarify the sorts of mismatch hypotheses advanced in evolutionary
medicine.
Finally, we turn to reproductive cancers in women; specifically, to breast can-
cer. In contemporary populations, most women bear fewer children, have children
3Nesse and Williams (1994); Gluckman and Hanson (2006); Gluckman et al. (2009) all
advance mismatch hypotheses of myopia as well, though their proposed mechanisms of action
differ.
4Other discussions of so-called ‘ancestral’ or ‘Paleolithic’ diets include Shatin (1964), Shatin
(1967), Eaton and Konner (1985), Eaton et al. (1999), Lindeberg et al. (1997), Lindeberg et al.
(2001), Lindeberg et al. (2007).
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later, and spend less time breastfeeding relative to women in hunter-gatherer pop-
ulations. As a consequence, it seems very likely that contemporary women experi-
ence a higher quantity of menstrual cycles than forager women do, and that they
spend more time in the interval between menarche and first full-term pregnancy.
Each menstrual cycle involves cellular turnover in the reproductive organs, and the
time from menarche to first birth is a time of particularly elevated turnover in the
breast duct glandular and epithelial cells, thereby increasing the risk of potentially
malignant mutations. Given that breast cancer appears to occur at significantly
lower rates in hunter-gatherer societies than in contemporary societies, it seems
plausible that some feature of the environment is responsible for the difference.
Evolutionary medicine researchers have proposed that changing reproductive pat-
terns constitute part of that explanation. (Nesse and Williams (1994): 179-181,
Eaton and Eaton III (1999): 430-436) Note here, again, that features of the EEA
(short interval between menarche and first birth, lifetime menstrual cycles esti-
mated at potentially fewer than 100, per Sievert (2008): 185) have changed in
contemporary societies, and there has been a commensurate increase in breast
cancer frequency. Eaton and Eaton III (1999) suggest that even in the absence of
a change in reproductive decisions, it may be possible to recreate the ancestral
hormonal milieu in part by using certain oral contraceptives to reduce menstrual
cycles. (Sievert (2008) argues that the evidence does not support such an inter-
vention.)
Again, I stress the hypothetical nature of the claims I describe here. I describe
them here only to give the reader a picture of the kind of mismatch hypotheses that
are proposed in evolutionary medicine. They strike me as interesting, plausible,
and potentially fruitful—well worth investigating, in other words. To review briefly:
in a mismatch hypothesis about health, a human health outcome is taken to be
caused by an environmental change relative to the EEA, such that the human
is less-well-adapted to the new environmental character(s).5 The EEA is then
examined for possible interventions, such that the particular features of the EEA
can be implemented in the contemporary environment—or, at least, adequately
simulated as in the contraceptive proposal above.
2.3 The trouble with fitness and health
In this section, I show that the concepts of fitness and health come apart, and
show that this is a problem for mismatch hypotheses in evolutionary medicine.
At this point, it is worth getting a bit more clear on the notion of evolutionary
fitness. The view I develop here does not depend on any specific characterization
of fitness, but for the sake of convenience I will draw briefly on the propensity in-
terpretation of fitness advanced by Mills and Beatty (1979): an organism’s fitness
is its propensity to leave offspring in the next generation in a particular environ-
ment. Consider (from Darwin (1859)) a population of deer in an environment with
wolf predation: a variant which is fleeter of foot will generally be more likely to
survive and reproduce than slower variants in the population. On the Mills and
Beatty (1979) view, then, the faster deer has a higher propensity to reproduce in
5This is not to take the position that all mismatch-relevant traits are adaptations, only
that some traits—including adaptive, neutral, and deleterious traits—may perform worse in a
novel environment relative to the EEA.
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an environment with wolves—and, therefore, a higher fitness. In such an environ-
ment, then, there is selection pressure in favor of higher speed in deer. Were the
deer exposed to no predation risk, faster deer might have no fitness advantage at
all.
Note above, however, that none of the three mismatch hypotheses I describe ac-
tually involve a claim about decreased fitness as a result of environmental change.
Instead, the claims are about health outcomes: scurvy, nearsightedness, and breast
cancer. Indeed, Lindeberg (2010) (148) implicitly acknowledges that in the con-
temporary environment, glasses reduce selection pressure against susceptibility to
myopia. In other words, the mere presence of myopia may not be fitness-reducing
in an environment where vision correction is available. Presumably, however, there
is some meaningful sense in which myopia involves decreased health. Similarly, in
the case of breast cancer which occurs late in life, potentially long after the con-
clusion of a particular woman’s reproductive career, it is plausible that despite
the devastating health consequences, the fitness consequences may be minimal—
even assuming we are concerned with inclusive fitness. Further, we can consider
cases where fitness and health vary differently. Take a 30-year-old, childless woman
who has had a tubal ligation (and is an only child of only children). Her inclusive
fitness—that is, her propensity to leave her genes in the next generation—is pre-
sumably near zero. Yet over the years, her health can improve or degrade with no
variation whatsoever in her fitness.
The problem may still seem obscure: surely healthier organisms are fitter or-
ganisms, and so any environment which reduces the health of the organisms in it
will also be an environment to which we can say that they are less-well-adapted
than they would be to a different, health-promoting environment. This response
is a fair one, and I will draw on the fitness relevance of physiological and psycho-
logical outcomes later when I propose the mismatch heuristic. For now, however,
it suffices to be clear that health and fitness can come apart.
None of this is to say that health and fitness never interact, of course. Devel-
oping scurvy at the age of 20 and dying would surely be fitness-reducing and also
health-reducing. The point, rather, is that evolutionary mismatch, understood as
something like poor fit or poor adaptation to environment, is presumably some-
thing about fitness—the ‘target’ of natural selection. An organism’s being less
healthy due to an environmental change is not clearly evolutionary, if there is no
fitness impact of the change. The evolutionary history part of the hypothesis—the
EEA, and adaptation to the EEA but not the contemporary environment—is taken
to form a rather large part of the explanation for why there is a loss of health in the
current environment at all. Mismatch hypotheses are intended to help formulate
interventions—e.g., by consuming an ‘ancestral’ diet to reduce insulin resistance.
Justifying the intervention often involves appealing to the presence of certain en-
vironmental factors in our EEA. If mismatch researchers need to determine the
presence (or absence) of a fitness effect before the use of mismatch is licensed in
clinical research and practice, this will require a great deal of antecedent biologi-
cal work which may slow rather than hasten the identification of clinically-useful
hypotheses. In that case, the concept seems unlikely to be of much clinical utility
except, perhaps, in more extreme cases in which, like scurvy, the fitness effect is
immediately apparent.
One might worry initially that the picture I paint is unfairly bleak: sure, my-
opia’s fitness effects may be unclear, but scurvy seems straightforward enough.
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Perhaps, the interlocutor might suggest, there are many mismatch cases which bear
more resemblance to scurvy than myopia. This is entirely possible. To the extent
that mismatch effects are similar to scurvy—major health and fitness effects—the
problem is less profound. Given the actual problems discussed in the mismatch
literature, however, which include many of the so-called ‘diseases of civilization’—
diseases which often occur after the close of the reproductive career6—many pu-
tative mismatch cases will not be cases of reduced fitness. This is, therefore, still
a problematic outcome for the mismatch theorist who thinks of mismatch as in-
volving some sort of decreased fit to environment.
Not all mismatch theorists treat mismatch solely as a fitness phenomenon.
Lloyd et al. (2011) propose a disjunctive view on which mismatch involves re-
duced health or reduced fitness due to environmental change relative to the EEA.
On this view, if health declines in a novel environment, they can diagnose it as
a mismatch—and that seems to get the mismatch theorist what she wants. The
problem, though, is the opacity of the connection between the two different types
of mismatch. Granted, the structure of the explanations is similar: both involve
an evolutionarily novel environment having some sort of negative effect. In this
account, however, mismatch is disunified as a concept. Some health mismatches
will not be fitness mismatches and vice versa. This seems to drop the evolutionary
core out of the mismatch explanation. An intuitive characterization of mismatch
attributes that mismatch to the organism’s lack of adaptation to the novel envi-
ronment. If the novel environment is having a health effect but no fitness effect,
however, a story about adaptation is the wrong kind of story. Moreover, specifying
two different types of mismatch with no intrinsic connection does not seem to be
the way that mismatch theorists think of evolutionary mismatch.7 I say a bit more
about this in section 3 when I discuss the extension of the optimal-environments
account of evolutionary mismatch developed in Morris (2018) to health.
A different non-fitness-focused view of mismatch is the teleofunctional account
developed in Cofnas (2016): mismatch obtains for an organism when an environ-
ment is different from the organism’s EEA such that one or more of the organ-
ism’s adaptive traits fail to perform their proper functions. Note that this view
requires neither a fitness effect nor a health effect. As Cofnas says, this lack of
concern for specific consequences means that some cases of mismatch will actually
be beneficial for an organism: a mouse living in a cat-free environment may per-
form no predation-avoidance behaviors, but this environment is surely beneficial
on this count. The challenge of using the teleofunctional account to talk about
evolutionary mismatch in health is apparent: evolutionary medicine is interested
in mismatch because researchers see mismatch as something worth alleviating. It
may be possible to massage the teleofunctional account in order to employ it in
evolutionary medicine, but at a first glance it does not seem to line up neatly with
the clinical and public health goals of mismatch theorists.
6A point of clarification here: physiological or psychological changes which manifest after
the close of the reproductive career can, of course, still effect fitness by, e.g., depriving descen-
dants of ‘grandparent care’. It seems plausible, however, that at least in some cases there will
be no commensurate fitness effect for some disease states which occur late in life.
7Some, e.g. Gluckman and Hanson (2006); Gluckman et al. (2009), have proposed recog-
nizing both evolutionary mismatch and developmental mismatch as different mismatch phe-
nomena. This is not the same distinction I describe here.
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Intermission
Let us consider what we have seen so far. We began by examining the concept of
evolutionary mismatch, with a special focus on its use in evolutionary medicine.
Mismatch hypotheses use some sense of poor fit to an environment (usually rel-
ative to a historical environment) to explain some phenomenon. In evolutionary
medicine, mismatch is used to explain negative health outcomes like scurvy, my-
opia, and breast cancer.
Although there is an intuitive connection between the idea of mismatch and
the observation of ‘new’ environmental factors like insulin resistance-promoting
diets, the connection becomes a little less clear when we attempt to drill down
on exactly how the evolutionary story plays an explanatory role. I have argued
that some mismatch hypotheses purport to explain diseases which plausibly do not
reduce fitness. In other words, this sort of “mismatch” does not look very much
like a picture of mismatch focused on fit to environment. Consequently, it seems
likely that mismatch hypotheses in principle will explain far less than mismatch
researchers want them to.
In the next sections, we will examine some ways that mismatch researchers
might try to handle this problem.
3 Health mismatches
Levins (1968) (14) describes phenotypes as having ‘optimal’ environments with
respect to a particular environmental character, e.g. temperature. The optimal
environment, for Levins, is the environment where the phenotype’s fitness is high-
est. Morris (2018) develops an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mis-
match: mismatch obtains for any organism which is not in its optimal environment,
which is just that environment where its fitness is maximized.
Earlier, I gave some reasons to think that a fitness-centric approach is unlikely
to allow for mismatch thinking of the sort that evolutionary medicine researchers
do. Perhaps they should adopt an optimal-environments account of ‘health mis-
match’, such that mismatch obtains for an organism if it is in an environment
which is not its ‘health-optimal’ environment—that environment where its health
is maximized.
The view has some intuitive appeal. If the optimal-environments account is
the right way to think about evolutionary mismatch, then here we have a nice
conceptual analogy: fitness mismatch involves reduced fitness relative to fitness
in the optimal environment; health mismatch involves reduced health relative to
health in the optimal environment. Both accounts direct our attention to consider-
ing what sort of environment would be optimal for a given organism. The accounts
would simply use different concepts of optimality: one would require comparison
of the present environment to an environment in which fitness is maximized; the
other would require comparison to an environment in which health is maximized.
Evolutionary mismatch hypotheses are always concerned with the effects of envi-
ronmental change—particularly novel environmental change—and this approach
would reflect that concern.
Despite these merits, however, this solution to the fitness-health problem has
some substantial deficiencies which lead me to rule it out.
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First, this sense of mismatch seems only vaguely evolutionary. The approach
runs into the same problem as the disjunctive view of mismatch proposed by Lloyd
et al. (2011), discussed above: the causal connection between health-mismatch and
fitness-mismatch is dubious. They appear quite plausibly to be distinct concepts
with neither leading obviously to the other or being subsumed by the other.
Second, it is harder to see how to think about health as being optimal (or
sub-optimal). The optimal-environments account of fitness relies on a quantitative
notion of fitness: if the organism is in an environment where its fitness measure-
ment is not as high as it could be in a different environment, then mismatch obtains
for the organism. Fitness concepts generally lend themselves to measurement of
an organism or variant’s total fitness, at least in principle. Health does not seem
to do so. What might it even mean to think of health simpliciter as a quantita-
tive concept? The most obvious quantifiable option—longevity—does not seem to
capture the qualitative aspects which so concern us in clinical practice. Myopia
may well decrease quality of life, but it may well not decrease quantity of life.
In short, then, the health-mismatch concept (1) seems to detach itself from
the evolutionary foundation of the fitness mismatch concept, and (2) is less clearly
coherent than the fitness-mismatch concept.
4 Excluding non-fitness hypotheses
Another approach we might take is simply eliminativist: if fitness is not impacted,
then mismatch does not obtain for the organism in question. Thus, the utility
of all mismatch hypotheses about health depends entirely on whether a fitness
effect occurs. On this view, researchers must first identify the fitness effects of
particular environmental factors, and only then proceed on to considering their
health consequences.
There is a clear advantage to this view: it is immediately clear that any mis-
match hypotheses about health outcomes are, in fact, evolutionary hypotheses.
If mismatch hypotheses purport to provide evolutionary explanations, one might
reasonably expect them to describe fitness outcomes—even if they also describe
health outcomes.
A major worry militates against this approach. I suspect that as a method-
ological matter fitness outcomes will only be known after health outcomes are
already understood. If this is the case, then mismatch hypotheses might provide
a deeper understanding of health outcomes, but they are unlikely to facilitate the
development of new, effective clinical interventions—surely a major desideratum
for evolutionary medicine research.
A critic might respond that the process of investigating the fitness effects of a
particular health outcome may reveal proximate causes which lead to new inter-
ventions. This cannot save the eliminativist approach, however: the eliminativist’s
proposal (as I have stipulated here) is that mismatch explanations only apply in
cases where fitness effects are known to be deleterious. We explore mismatch hy-
potheses because they suggest explanations and interventions which are of clinical
interest. It seems that in order to investigate the fitness effects of an environmental
change which caused a deleterious health outcome, we would need to accomplish
the following: identify the environmental change which appears to have caused
the change; identify a health effect of interest in the novel environment; identify
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fitness in the past and novel environments. This seems to carry the investigation
a step further than is necesssary for thinking about the particular health outcome
in question.8 This does, however, suggest another approach: the use of mismatch
as a clinical heuristic for hypothesis formation.
5 Mismatch as clinical heuristic
Thus far, we have seen a problem for the use of evolutionary mismatch in health
research. We have further seen that two superficially-plausible solutions fail. In
this section, I propose my solution to the problem.
I begin by discussing the notion of heuristics coming out of early artificial
intelligence research (e.g. Simon and Newell (1971)), and describe some of the
features of heuristics as characterized by Wimsatt (2006, 2007). Following e.g.
Nesse (2008), I argue that evolutionary mismatch has value as a heuristic; I further
suggest that this employment can sidestep the fitness-health tension in mismatch
research which I have laid out in the earlier parts of this paper.
The basic view can be summarized as follows: when I suggest using the mis-
match framework as a heuristic, I mean that we can use the framework to shrink
the search space when looking for possible solutions to clinical problems. The
nature of the mismatch heuristic is a form of analogical reasoning. Further, my
argument is focused primarily on the merits of mismatch as a heuristic rather than
as an explanation in its own right—not on the merits of the mismatch heuristic
relative to other heuristics in the health sciences.
5.1 Heuristics for discovery
Early artificial intelligence (AI) researchers recognized a challenge in trying to
develop problem-solving machines: computers run on algorithms, i.e., unambiguous
sets of instructions which will take one unfailingly from input to consistent output.
One approach to problem-solving is to map out a problem space, or search space,
within which the program can search for solutions to the problem. Naturally,
the limits of computational power constrain the extent of the possible search. A
sufficiently-large problem space will render an exhaustive search computationally
intractable, and triage is required.
The rules of thumb for shrinking the problem space are heuristics. Heuristics
help us identify those parts of the problem space likely—or unlikely—to be prof-
itable, should we decide to search them (Simon and Newell (1971)). It is important
to be clear: heuristics are imperfect rules. Even very fruitful heuristics will some-
times exclude correct solutions. The value of a heuristic, then, is not that it serves
unerringly as our North Star but, rather, that following the heuristic will tend to
lead us to the right answer—or at the very least, rule out many wrong answers.
Wimsatt (2007) (76-77) describes four general features of heuristics in the
sciences: (1) heuristics sometimes generate false outputs; (2) heuristics are cost-
effective; (3) the false outputs of heuristics will be nonrandom; (4) heuristics trans-
8This does not, of course, mean that there is no reason to investigate fitness outcomes.
The point is just that identifying the environmental cause of a health outcome is all we need
for clinical research.
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form the problem into a “nonequivalent but intuitively related problem.” I will
touch on each of these briefly, and then consider the latter two in section 5.3 be-
low. To (1): as Wimsatt says, heuristics are not truth-preserving algorithms. Even
when applied correctly, rules of thumb sometimes lead us astray. In other words,
sometimes the correct solution is hiding in a different part of the problem space
which our heuristic told us not to search. One can think here of how a particular
decision in chess might generally be unwise (e.g. sacrificing a queen to capture a
pawn), but could contribute to victory in a specific game. I take it that I have
already explained (2) sufficiently above. To (3): the idea here is that due to the
structure of a particular heuristic, it will generate wrong answers in response to
certain variations of a more general problem. Newtonian physics might be a useful
heuristic when one is attempting to calculate the trajectory of a bullet fired from
a human-portable firearm, but will reliably lead one astray with objects which are
much larger or much faster. To (4): the use of a heuristic reshapes a problem, e.g.
such that it becomes a problem of choosing from a smaller set of possible solutions.
Now, we turn to thinking about scientific discovery and theory generation.
5.2 Hypothesis formation and scientific discovery
Traditionally, philosophers have taken the view that the context of discovery9 is
not governed by any particular logic. Any particular method for dreaming up hy-
potheses is legitimate; the real question is whether the hypothesis in question can
be justified on the basis of observation. Without taking any particular stance on
the utility of visions of an ouroboros in one’s fireplace, here I will follow Lind-
ley Darden’s work on discovery and hypothesis formation. Darden (1991) suggests
that hypothesis formation may proceed legitimately, in some cases, from the use of
scientific analogies. Analogical reasoning depends on finding (‘retrieving’) an ex-
plained phenomenon relevantly similar to the explanandum at hand such that one
may legitimately appeal to causal patterns in the former to construct hypotheses
about the latter. Darden (245) says that
In Mendelian genetics, once one knows how to explain 3:1 ratios for a cross
between yellow and green peas, that can serve as an exemplar (a close
analog) for explaining a cross between tall and short peas or between red-
eyed and white-eyed fruit flies.
In other words, the dominant/recessive explanation for the particular ratios in
crosses of yellow and green peas allows one legitimately to hypothesize that a
similar effect is at work in other reproductive outcomes. Once one has a general
schema (as Darden calls it) for the phenomena in question, one can legitimately
search for specific instantiations of this schema in the phenomena. In other words,
one uses well-explained phenomena to guide hypothesis formation about the ex-
plananda. (Analogical reasoning is not, of course, the only legitimate means of
hypothesis formation.)
Analogical reasoning of this sort is prevalent in science. Nyrup (2018) points to
three broad ways that philosophers of science have defended the use of analogical
9I do not claim that there are perfectly separable contexts of discovery and justification;
I just need a toehold for the distinction between theory generation and theory choice, cf.
Okruhlik (1994).
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reasoning: theory generation of the sort that Darden describes here, theory justi-
fication, and theory pursuit (i.e. development and investigation). In other words,
philosophers have advocated the use of analogical reasoning in the contexts of
discovery, justification, and pursuit, respectively. In the context of pursuit, analo-
gies with some scientific problems may lend plausibility to particular solutions
for other scientific problems. Similarly, although she does not use the language
of pursuit here, Darden (1991) (247) notes that analogies provide a “weak form
of plausibility” for new hypotheses, in that a hypothesis “constructed by analogy
to a known...process” is more plausible than a hypothesis relying on some wholly
new causal schema.
5.3 The mismatch heuristic
We now have a general picture of how heuristics and analogical reasoning can
be used in science. Like other heuristics, the mismatch heuristic I propose can
be used to identify particularly-plausible hypotheses for investigation. In using
mismatch as a heuristic for discovery and pursuit, we employ analogical reasoning.
In other words: the mismatch heuristic is the use of an evolutionary analogy to
form hypotheses about the proximate causes of health outcomes.
Given that the desired outcome of this analogical reasoning is not an explana-
tory hypothesis per se, the move requires justification. I describe in turn two
justificatory analogies for this move: epidemiological hypotheses about health out-
comes and evolutionary hypotheses about fitness outcomes. Although the focus
of the paper is of course evolutionary medicine, the epidemiology analogy seems
usefully similar. I take it that these two analogies, taken together, show that the
mismatch framework is prima facie reasonable as a method for hypothesis gen-
eration. In other words, analogical reasoning is involved at two points. First, we
reason from evolutionary premises to health hypotheses: we treat the latter as
analogous to fitness hypotheses. Second, we justify that move by appealing to its
close similarity to ordinary reasoning within both epidemiology and evolutionary
biology.
Per Broadbent (2013), epidemiology is concerned with explaining the “distri-
bution and determinants of disease” across populations. In other words, epidemi-
ologists investigate the population-level frequencies of various forms of morbidity,
and also examine the distribution of causes of morbidity. In particular, epidemi-
ologists often look at putative environmental causes of morbidity and mortality.
For example, an epidemiologist might examine the relative frequencies of handgun
ownership across populations and seek to determine the presence or absence of a
correlation with relative suicide rates. If handgun ownership is associated with a
higher suicide rate, then handgun ownership would be considered a ‘risk factor’
for suicide. The Framingham Study is particularly well known for identifying a
variety of risk factors for cardiovascular disease. (Kannel et al. (1964), Krieger
(2011): 150-156)
Epidemiological hypotheses, then, will often involve three key factors: a popula-
tion, a health outcome, and a putative environmental cause of the health outcome
in question. Note the similarity here to a mismatch hypothesis. A mismatch hy-
pothesis will generally claim that change in an environmental character—say, the
availability of ‘cheap’ energy—has resulted in a change in health outcomes—an
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increase in, perhaps, metabolic syndrome. If we take an inference to be broadly
legitimate in epidemiology when it moves from the conjunction of changes in dis-
ease distribution and changes in environmental characters to a hypothesis about
particular causes, then it seems that a similar method for hypothesis formation
using a mismatch framework ought also to be seen as broadly legitimate. In other
words, the mismatch framework is sufficiently similar to ordinary epidemiological
reasoning that acceptance of the latter licenses (at least) tentative acceptance of
the former.
Naturally, disease-environment correlations do not automatically license the
conclusion that a particular environmental character is the cause of a change in
disease distribution in either epidemiology or evolutionary medicine. Rather, both
frameworks—mismatch and epidemiological—can properly motivate the investi-
gation of particular mechanistic causes, of possible interventions, and so forth. At
the very least, someone who objects to the mismatch framework but not a broader
epidemiological methodology owes us an argument.
One might worry that I conflate here so-called ‘causes of cases’ and ‘causes of
incidence’, as coined by Rose (1985): the causes of a particular patient’s illness
and the causes of the distribution of that illness in a population. This need not be
the case. That e.g. myopia may be far more prevalent in industrialized societies
than agricultural societies due to an increase in close-in work, even if true, does
not automatically license the conclusion that Jones has myopia because she is a
software engineer. In making this argument, I am suggesting something like what
we see in e.g. Koeth et al. (2013). They argue that human gut bacteria metabolize
L-carnitine (a compound prevalent in red meat) such that the risk of cardiovascu-
lar disease (CVD) increases. The paper explicitly notes the observed association
between CVD and red meat consumption in industrialized societies, and further
notes that the previously-assumed culprit—saturated fat in red meat—does not
appear to be associated with CVD. In other words, they use two major epidemio-
logical findings in an attempt to drill down and identify a specific causal mechanism
for the observed association. Note: their proposed explanation (if correct) does not
entail that Smith personally suffered a heart attack due to his overfondness for
bacon—only that the phenomenon’s prevalence at the population level is explained
by the mechanism. Identifying the causes of cases is a tricky business well beyond
the scope of this paper, and here instead I focus on causes of incidence.
Let us now examine the evolutionary analogy. Consider again Darwin’s example
of deer and wolves. In this case, some deer are faster than others, and pass on their
speed to their offspring. Those deer are more likely to evade wolf predation and,
consequently, over the generations their offspring will make up a larger proportion
of the population. (Naturally, there could be corresponding selection for speed
in wolves.) Mean fleetness of the population as a whole will tend to increase.
If the environment suddenly changes, however, such that speed is no longer an
advantage—say, due to an invasion by ambush predators—the population may
evolve differently. In this changed environment, perhaps selection will now work
most strongly in favor of variants more attuned to the scent of their predators.
In this example, environmental change alters the fitness of particular variants
within the deer population. As in the epidemiological case above, we consider an
environmental factor, a population, and a particular fitness outcome. This is, of
course, the basic form of an ordinary mismatch explanation.
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A mismatch hypothesis about health, then, is an attempt to explain a health
outcome like myopia as the result of a changed selection environment: due to
changes in selection pressures relative to the EEA, certain traits become disad-
vantageous and result in negative health outcomes. As I explain below, the evo-
lutionary reasoning which grounds this hypothesis may be wrong, but it is likely
to be useful : it directs our attention to changing health-salient features of the
environment.
The mismatch framework’s structural analogies with epidemiological and evo-
lutionary hypotheses give it some intrinsic plausibility. Note an additional analogy:
in both epidemiological explanations and mismatch health explanations, the same
basic outcome (health) is of interest. In a conventional evolutionary explanation,
fitness is the outcome of interest. This need not do away entirely with the analogy,
however: many physiological and psychological outcomes will be both fitness and
health effects; indeed, health effects are likely necessary for many kinds of fitness
effects to obtain. Thus, while mismatch hypotheses about fitness have an explanan-
dum distinct from that of mismatch explanations about health, the phenomena of
interest will often overlap. This is the fourth of the criteria from Wimsatt (2007)
above: it transforms a problem (explaining observed health effects) into a related
problem (explaining putative fitness effects). This, too, bestows plausibility on
mismatch explanations of health outcomes.
The core difficulty on which the paper is focused remains, however: sometimes,
fitness and health do not track each other, and in those cases a conventional mis-
match explanation seems inadequate for understanding a particular health out-
come.
I propose that with respect to health outcomes, we treat this mismatch frame-
work as a heuristic: we use the framework to shrink the search space so that our at-
tention is directed to plausibly salient features of the environment (evolutionarily-
novel features, here), and we use the framework to identify particular live hypothe-
ses which are worth pursuit. In the old parlance, then, we can use the heuristic as
a discovery heuristic and a pursuit heuristic.
I do not suggest merely that we ought first to look at mismatch explanations
for particular health effects and then, finding no fitness effect, discard the mis-
match framework. Instead, I suggest that the mismatch heuristic can direct our
attention to particular features of the environment—evolutionarily novel features
of the environment (or features discordant with the optimal environment, following
Morris (2018))—which we can then test for causal relevance. In other words, we
can use the framework of ultimate explanations as a heuristic to identify possible
proximate explanations, while recognizing that the ultimate explanation implied
by the mismatch heuristic—while plausible—may be wrong.
The idea that an evolutionary perspective can have heuristic value for medicine
is not original to this paper. Nesse (2008) (425) explicitly argues this. I go beyond
Nesse in arguing that treating mismatch as a heuristic can help resolve the fitness-
health tension inherent to so much of mismatch research. In particular, I allow that
the correct ultimate explanation for a given health outcome caused by a novel en-
vironment may not involve mismatch at all; my particular concern is whether that
mismatch framework helps us to develop useful clinical and public health interven-
tions. To the extent that the mismatch heuristic directs our attention to interesting
hypotheses about proximate (i.e. environmental rather than evolutionary) causes,
it succeeds. If, when the dust settles, the health effect in question also appears to
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involve a fitness effect, then so much the better. In that case, we need not merely
treat the phenomenon as though it were a case of evolutionary mismatch; it would,
in fact, be a case of evolutionary mismatch.
Why use the mismatch heuristic at all? For at least two reasons: first, as Lloyd
et al. (2011) say, we know that human environments have changed tremendously
in the last few millennia; second, certain diseases seem characteristic of exactly
those populations whose environments have changed the most. In other words,
rather than searching through all conceivable environmental causes (a rather large
problem space), we shrink the problem space down to a more manageable size
by looking first at the evolutionarily novel factors. We may not know if every
environmentally-caused negative health effect is a result of evolutionary mismatch,
but we know that it is the sort of effect which could be caused by mismatch.
Consider now this brief sketch of how one might employ the mismatch heuristic:
1. A particular health outcome is believed to be caused by environment (due,
perhaps, to a rapid increase in its prevalence).
2. This particular outcome seems not to show up in ancestral human populations,
e.g. contemporary hunter-gatherers.
3. The researcher turns her attention to focus particularly on those environmen-
tal factors which most strongly break from the EEA, either carving off those
parts of the search space which do not involve evolutionary novelty, or—if live
hypotheses already exist—pursuing those which fit into a mismatch framework.
I take it that an accommodating shrug is all I require from those who think
that discovery, unlike justification, is ungoverned by normative considerations. For
those who think, following e.g. Langley et al. (1987) (54), that scientific discovery
requires us to evaluate the heuristics we use, allow me to dally a bit longer on
the analogical reasoning to which I appeal. Recall that (as discussed in section
5.2) analogies can lend plausibility to new hypotheses. Recall, further, that I have
pointed to analogies between (1) the mismatch heuristic and ordinary evolutionary
explanations, and (2) the mismatch heuristic and ordinary epidemiological expla-
nations. Both analogies involve a similar explanatory structure concerned with the
impact of environmental changes on populations in those environments. The na-
ture of the impacts—fitness and health, respectively—are overlapping (and likely
broadly correlated) but distinct. Given the close analogy between these types of
explanations and the similarity between the outcomes of interest, the mismatch
heuristic lends some initial plausibility to the hypotheses it helps us to generate—
assuming, of course, that in using the mismatch heuristic researchers appeal to
genuine environmental differences.
The mismatch heuristic succeeds when its evolutionary framework directs our
attention to correct proximate explanations. The mismatch heuristic fails when it
directs our attention to incorrect proximate explanations—particularly when those
proximate explanations are uncorrelated with correct explanations. All heuristics
fail sometimes, of course, and per Wimsatt (2007) above a given heuristic should
fail in ways characteristic of that heuristic. When, then, should we expect the
mismatch heuristic to fail? The mismatch heuristic leads us astray, first, when we
näıvely assume that plausible evolutionary explanations are good enough to give
us health explanations. The heuristic leads us astray, second, when the correct ex-
planation involves fitness-neutral environmental changes and the wrong proximate
explanation is selected. In other words, the mismatch heuristic characteristically
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fails us when we have selection-irrelevant environmental changes which distract us
from the correct explanation.
5.4 Advantages of the account
Mismatch concept agnosticism: an advantage of this account is that it does not
require debating what mismatch, as a biological phenomenon, actually is. (Lloyd
et al. (2011), Garson (2015), Cofnas (2016), and Morris (2018) all discuss this in
more detail.) I intentionally do not consider whether ‘real’ mismatch is a fitness-
only phenomenon, or also a health phenomenon. Solving that problem is of course a
worthy endeavor, but the nature of mismatch as an evolutionary phenomenon need
not be resolved before mismatch can be used responsibly in clinical research and
practice. This is particularly important given that we might reasonably question
whether humans experience decreased fitness in contemporary environments: if the
population growth rate has increased after the dawn of agriculture, then it seems
mismatch has decreased. This problem for mismatch has been discussed by, e.g.,
Méthot (2011, 2015), and my approach here sidesteps the worry.
Health concept agnosticism: a related advantage of this account is that
we need not have a fully worked-out picture of what it means for a physiolog-
ical or psychological state to be a state of health or disease. The ultimate goal
of the account is finding proximate explanations for outcomes of interest. That
practitioners take some outcomes to be healthy or diseased may help explain their
interest in an explanation, but it does not play a role in the mismatch heuristic
itself. Thus, this provides a pragmatic response to well-defined-but-unsettled bat-
tle over naturalist vs. normativist health concepts.10 As long as we can identify
particular physiological or psychological outcomes of interest, we need not have a
unified picture of what ‘counts’ as health or disease.
5.5 The problem space
Now that we have seen both the basic account and some reasons to like the account,
let us circle back to a question the reader may have. To this point, I have talked
a fair bit about using the mismatch framework to shrink the problem space to be
searched. I have not yet explained how to generate the problem space.
One way we might think about this: the problem space is ‘out there’ already, in
the sense that (perhaps) there is just a fact about what specific sequences obtain
in all possible chess games. In that same sense, all possible proximate causes of
a given health outcome are out there to be searched, and the mismatch heuristic
simply directs our attention to the evolutionarily salient ones. I find this answer
to be unduly fuzzy, however—not least because it is not clear a problem space
is already waiting for us to search it. After all, part of the reason for heuristics
in chess is that we simply cannot generate the problem space and then search
through it.
10Since it is the best-defined part of the dispute, I refer here to the debate between what
Kingma (2014) has called Domain II naturalism and Domain II normativism. The mismatch
heuristic is agnostic with respect to disputes in the other domains she identifies as well.
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Fortunately, Simon and Newell (1971) have a suggestion for us: one source
of information for generating problem spaces is our “previous experience with
analogous tasks” (155). In other words, when we recognize that we face a problem
related to a previously-explored problem, we can use a similar problem space.
What is our problem space here, then? It seems that the most obvious answer is
the sum of epidemiological and anthropological knowledge of human environments
(broadly construed to include culture, lifestyle, and so forth). When we suspect
that a negative health outcome is caused by the environment, then, we know that
our problem space is—at an outer bound—human environments. (Realistically,
when attempting to generate hypotheses this can be narrowed to actual knowledge
about human environments, not human environments broadly.)
Once we have our problem space mapped out, which gives us our set of possible
environmental factors to explore, we can apply the mismatch heuristic. The evolu-
tionarily novel subset of total environmental factors to which humans are exposed
comprises the post-heuristic problem space to be searched. One might imagine,
if the reader will pardon the colorful illustration, a grille cipher: our ‘encrypted’
message is the problem space, or a list of environmental factors to which some
humans are exposed. Our cipher’s cut-outs appear only over evolutionarily novel
environmental factors, thus reducing the search space to the ‘decrypted’ message.
(In practice, of course, the search would involve a mix of qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis of the sort regularly used in epidemiological research—attempting
to identify correlations among health outcomes and environmental variables iden-
tified as evolutionarily salient.)
5.6 Viability for research programs
It is worth reiterating at this point that the intent of this paper is not to lay
out a comprehensive case for the usefulness of mismatch thinking in medicine.
Instead, I have pointed out a problem in mismatch thinking—the fitness-health
tension—and proposed a solution for the problem. In other words, I have sought to
ensure proper conceptual housekeeping among evolutionary medicine researchers.
If someone is inclined to view mismatch thinking unfavorably (at least with respect
to its use in medicine), I have not tried to convince her otherwise. In particular, I
have not tried to convince such a person that she should surrender heuristics she
has found fruitful in her own research—not least because there is no reason to see
the mismatch heuristic as excluding most or all other heuristics. (The causation-
detection heuristics in Hill (1965), for example, ought to be entirely compatible
with the use of the mismatch heuristic.)
With that caveat, there is some reason to think that mismatch thinking has
been scientifically fruitful. Although they do not use the term ‘mismatch’, Eaton
and Konner (1985) clearly employ mismatchy thinking when they point to di-
etary changes in pre- vs. post-agricultural societies to explain the presence of the
so-called “diseases of civilization”. Neel (1962), in proposing his famous “thrifty
genotype” hypothesis, similarly points to environmental change in modern soci-
eties relative to “primitive” societies as a causal factor in the recent rise of diabetes
rates. Both papers have earned considerable follow-on research, clinical trials, and
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so forth.11 The presence of active research programs to evaluate these mismatch
hypotheses is strong prima facie evidence of the mismatch heuristic’s utility.
6 Taking stock
I have argued that evolutionary mismatch explanations of health and disease can
conflate fitness and health. To resolve this tension, I have proposed the use of
mismatch as a heuristic to reduce the size of the problem space to be searched,
such that researchers can zero in on evolutionarily novel environmental factors. At
this stage, the hypothesis is actually a proximate hypothesis which needs to be
tested like any other.
The goal of this paper has not primarily been to convince the skeptical reader
that evolutionary mismatch research is valuable. That would require far more
space than I have here. Instead, I have tried to show that the mismatch heuristic
can be used without running aground on the shoals of conceptual confusion.
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